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Mark A. Grabe;
The decision handed down by the United States Supreme Court
in Bush v. Gore,' when read superficially, promises a renaissance for
progressive constitutional thinking. The per curiam opinion in that
case, on the basis of an exceptionally generous reading of the Four-
teenth Amendment, insisted that the principle of "one person, one
vote" required that all ballots in a statewide recount be judged under
a uniform state standard.2 Eschewing paeans to local diversity and
the Tenth Amendment right of states to determine their electoral
practices, as well as any references to the original intentions of the
persons responsible for the relevant constitutional provisions or any
case previously decided by the Rehnquist Court, the per curiam opin-
ion in Bush relied primarily on Warren Court decisions that had given
conservatives apoplexy when decided thirty years previously. Citing
both Harper v. Virginia Board of Election? and Reynolds v. Sims,4 the Jus-
tices solemnly declared that the state court-ordered recount had to
be suspended because "the State may not, by... arbitrary and dispa-
rate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another."5 Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion suggested that Justice Scalia,
Justice Thomas, and he were far more sympathetic to the living Con-
stitution than heretofore suspected. The Chief Justice made no ref-
erence to any person responsible for the framing or ratification of
the Fourteenth Amendment and cited no Rehnquist Court precedent
on federalism. He distinguished a Burger Court precedent obligat-
ing the Justices to "defer to state courts on the interpretation of state
law", on the authority of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson and Bouie
v. City of Columbia.8 These two Warren Court decisions substantially
broadened previous constitutional understandings of Fourteenth
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Amendment liberties to protect the rights of civil rights organizations
and protestors.9 Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Bush was the only opin-
ion in that case that relied extensively on recent judicial opinions
celebrating the virtues of federalism.0
Bush v. Gore read more realistically promises dark days for pro-
gressives in the United States. The explicit and implicit understand-
ing in the Court's opinion is that the Supreme Court's expansive un-
derstanding of equal protection is good only for that case. As the per
curiamJusices opined, "[ o lur consideration is limited to the present
circumstances."" No one thinks that the many persons of color de-
nied the right to vote or have their votes counted in Florida will be
able to ride the Bush precedent to victory in federal court. Present
Rehnquist Court doctrine apparently is that conservative understand-
ings of constitutional rights govern unless those understandings
threaten conservative political prospects. 2 Worse, Bush v. Gore guar-
antees that the federal judiciary for the foreseeable future will be
dominated by persons with conservative understandings of constitu-
tional equality rights and of more general constitutional principles.
During his campaign, President Bush expressed his admiration for
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Conservative ideologues presently con-
trol the Bush Administration's Justice Department.14 The best pro-
gressive constitutionalists can hope for is that some combination of
Senate Democrats and "moderate" Republican electoral needs suffice
to yield a next generation of federal judges and Supreme Court Jus-
tices who are reasonably moderate conservatives or, at least, princi-
pled conservatives, willing to apply conservative constitutional princi-
ples even when their immediate beneficiaries are more progressive
political interests.
Given the likely direction of constitutional doctrine in federal
courts for the foreseeable future, progressives should consider cele-
brating present equal protection jurisprudence. Fourteenth
'Bush, 531 U.S. at 113-15 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
10 See generally id. at 135-44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Were the other Members of this
Court as mindful as they generally are of our system of dual sovereignty," Justice Ginsburg con-
cluded, "they would affirm the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court." Id. at 142-43 (Gins-
burgJ., dissenting).
" Bush, 531 U.S. at 109.
1 Bush may suggest that Rehnquist Court decisions upholding legal abortion, see Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and striking down laws discriminating against homo-
sexuals, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), are best understood as keeping certain social
issues that harm Republicans out of the political arena. The day after Casey was handed down,
the first sentence of the analysis article on the front page of the New York Times declared, "From
the standpoint of President Bush's re-election strategy, today's Supreme Court ruling on abor-
tion took the edge off a recurring Republican nightmare." Robin Toner, RulingEases a Worry for
Bush, but Just Wait, His Citics Warn, N.Y. TIMEs,June 30, 1992, at Al.
13 See Jim Drinkard & William M. Welch, Rivals Present Contrary VTiews on Key Issues, USA
TODAY, Oct 4, 2000, at 6A.
14 Cf The White House and the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2001, at A18 (describing the political
issues in President Bush's future judicial selections).
Jan. 20021
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Amendment law is so satisfactory at present, critical legal theorists
might contend, that the Supreme Court should not take any case that
would require the Justices to rethink any aspect of equal protection
doctrine. In other words, these theorists hope that the Rehnquist
Court will not decide equal protection cases for the next four years.
Even better, the Court should declare a moratorium on making any
constitutional decisions. In light of the wonderful job the federal
courts have been doing for the past decade, Congress should reward
that bench by passing legislation giving all federal judges a well-
deserved four-year vacation. If the Justices on the Supreme Court
nevertheless feel some conscientious compulsion to earn their sala-
ries, their efforts might be directed towards rethinking those difficult
Western state disputes over rights to the North Platte River, a matter
that has never been satisfactorily resolved 5 If Justice Thomas wants
to reopen long decided constitutional controversies in the name of
original understandings, 6 the Court should begin by rethinking the
annexation of Texas, a matter which if decided correctly would result
in Al Gore being declared President of the United States.
7
This Essay explores the practice of theorizing about equal protec-
tion doctrine or any other aspect of constitutional law by persons out
of power. The standard essay on constitutional doctrine seeks to pro-
vide Justices with the right reasons for reaching the right results in
constitutional cases. The only difference between essays by persons
in power and persons out of power is often the degree to which the
scholar believes the Supreme Court needs instruction. The following
pages challenge this widespread assumption that doctrinal analysis
and constitutional theorizing ought not be influenced by the consti-
tutional tendencies of the present Supreme Court or the present ad-
ministration, either because Justices (and perhaps other constitu-
tional decision makers) ought to be open to any good constitutional
argument or because constitutional commentators should speak to a
more enduring audience than the present ruling coalition. Persons
in power have different short term goals than persons out of power.
Constitutional commentators sympathetic with the incumbent regime
have an opportunity to make their ideal constitutional understand-
ings official constitutional law. The best constitutional commentators
unsympathetic with the incumbent regime can do is provide argu-
ments that may strengthen the hand of the faction within the domi-
See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1 (1995).
16 See, e.g., Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538-39 (1998) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(suggesting that Calder v. Bul 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798), be overruled); Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court should abandon negative Commerce Clause doctrine dat-
ing from the early nineteenth century).
17 Cf Sanford Levinson, Wy the Canon Should Be Expanded To Include the Insular Cases and the
Saga ofAnerican Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 256-57 (2000) (discussing unresolved
issues regarding the annexation of Texas).
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nant coalition deemed the lesser evil. Persons in power must also act
more immediately than persons out of power. The incumbent ad-
ministration must make decisions concerning constitutional ideals
that the opposition may avoid. Constitutional commentators who are
constructing constitutional meanings that might become official only
at some unknown point in the future need not and should not in-
clude the level of detail necessary for persons responsible for official
constitutional meanings in the present. Not knowing what the politi-
cal universe will look like when progressives will again influence offi-
cial constitutional meanings, little reason exists for making specific
arguments that inevitably depend on the specifics of that political
universe.
My particular perspective colors the details, but not the central
themes, of this Article. That perspective is of a person sympathetic
with the sort of economic policies favored by democratic socialists
who is writing at a time when the national government has been con-
trolled by a center-right coalition for at least a generation. The issues
discussed below, however, are hardly limited to progressives in 2002
or more generally to constitutional thinking in 2002. All persons
more than a standard political deviation from the center-right have
little influence on official constitutional meanings at present. Serious
libertarians are no more likely than progressives to influence the pre-
sent production of constitutional meaning on most issues. Social
conservatives were similarly out of power throughout most of the
1960s. Just as the wicked child expresses estrangement from the
community during Passover by asking, "[w]hat is this observance to
you?,"' so progressives, and others presently estranged from the offi-
cial constitutional community, should be asking "what is the meaning
of constitutional theory for us?"
Americans estranged from the official constitutional lawmaking
process typical rely on counter-constitutional stories of redemption.
Proponents of politically disfavored positions continually produce
elaborately detailed and justified constitutions-in-exile or, in J.M.
Balkin's apt phrase, "Shadow Constitution[s]."'9 These shadow con-
stitutions lay out the constitutional meanings that would become offi-
cial should the author or his political faction acquire the power nec-
essary to articulate official constitutional meanings. Professor Balkin
has asked what declaring allegiance to the Constitution means when
what one is doing is really declaring allegiance to one's own shadow
constitution instead of the official Constitution as presently inter-
"s A PASSOVER HAGGADAH 30 (Herbert Bronstein ed., Viking Press 2d ed. 1982) (emphasis
omitted).
" eeJ.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and Other Objects of OurFaitl 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703,
1714 (1997).
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preted.20 My concern is with the structure of shadow constitutions,
with whether they ought to mirror their official counterparts.
Progressive constitutional energy at present is not best spent end-
lessly refining and elaborating a constitution-in-exile. Little chance
exists that the present Supreme Court majority will move in the direc-
tions suggested by progressive constitutional theory.21 Progressives
are likely to influence present constitutional meanings only by devis-
ing arguments that convince some conservative officeholders to
maintain what progressives perceive to be a very imperfect status quo.
Moreover, a constitution-in-exile does not require the same degree of
justification and detail as the official constitution. Progressives do
not know what the political window of opportunity will look like at
the time when they can influence official constitutional meanings.
They do not know what the state of the law will be, and they cannot
accurately assess the normative costs and benefits of particular poli-
cies at that future time. While the party in power must often make
very specific choices concerning their notion of constitutional equal-
ity, progressive constitutional theory ought to be satisfied with chart-
ing in a general way the directions progressives would go if given the
power to influence official constitutional meaning.
Fixated on trying to convert President Bush and Justice Scalia to
democratic socialism, present progressive theorizing, and constitu-
tional theorizing in general, rarely helps actual democratic socialists
and other progressives out of power make those constitutional
choices that such persons must presently make. Constitutional theory
tends to consist of arguments for particular constitutional ideals. Lit-
tle theory helps persons on the fringes of power establish constitu-
tional priorities for exercising their limited political authority to in-
fluence legislation and vet political appointments. The minority
party in the Senate is not able to secure the appointment of ideal ju-
dicial nominees, but does have some power through filibusters and
negotiation to prevent particularly hostile nominees. Such decisions,
however, require an ordering of constitutional values that, with rare
exception,22 are never a part of constitutional theory.
Much progressive constitutional theorizing also presents the pres-
ent political regime as fundamentally more liberal than is actually the
case. Bruce Ackerman, in particular, fosters the impression that the
present political order is structured by past constitutional moments
when persons with progressive conceptions of equality significantly
influenced the production of official constitutional meanings.
Cf at 1724-25 ("constructing a Shadow Constitution ... does not avoid the real problem
of constitutional faith").
2 Though, as noted infra, progressive arguments are likely to fall on sympathetic ears in
some states and in some lower federal tribunals.
' See Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703, 714-44
(1980) (describing when decisions reflect constitutional ideologies).
See generally BRUCE AcKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter
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Whatever the normative merits of this and related claims, past pro-
gressive triumphs do not a progressive regime make, even in the ab-
sence of an intervening conservative constitutional moment, constitu-
tional amendment, or even major constitutional precedent. Philip A.
Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith better describe the American political
order when they note that rare moments of racial progress are sys-
temically followed by lengthy periods of conservative retrenchment.24
This suggests that progressives will return to power only when they
successfully tell a new constitutional story. Older progressive narra-
tives have lost their capacity to inspire electoral majorities.
Conventional rethinking of constitutional equality from progres-
sive and other out of power perspectives often proves quite valuable
even when politically inefficacious. Most of us are employed as peda-
gogues, not politicians. As pedagogues we have less reason than po-
litical actors to confine our thinking to present political possibilities.
Professors attempt to foster habits of critical thinking that students
will be able to use when in the future they are called on to consider
various known and yet unknown political and jurisprudential prob-
lems. Law professors, in particular, teach their students to argue be-
fore the full spectrum of potential judges, not just those judges pres-
ently on the federal bench. Participation in scholarly debates over
doctrine improves teaching more directly. At least, I am most effec-
tive as a teacher when I have done extensive thinking and writing on
some subject matter. Thus, in my capacity as undergraduate and
graduate professor, efforts to rethink the meaning of constitutional
equality in the United States are welcomed. This Essay merely ques-
tions the political value of conventional progressive efforts to rethink
equal protection doctrine.s
AcKERmAN, FOUNDATIONS]; BRUcE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998)
[hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]. The claims made in this paragraph will be dis-
cussed infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
"4 See PHILIP A. KLINKNER & ROGERS M. SMITH, THE UNSTEADY MARCH: THE RISE AND
DECLINE OF RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 4-5 (1999) (asserting that while racial progress was
made during three phases, the years in between brought extended regression in racial equal-
ity) This emphasis on the political function of constitutional argument merges the truth and
advocacy function of scholarship. Scholars should speak truth and "truth to power." See Bruce
Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale; 108 YALE LJ. 2279, 234749 (1999) (urging legal schol-
ars not to detach themselves from practical concerns of lawyers, judges, and politicians, but
rather to try to influence the practice of law with their scholarly efforts). An infinite amount of
truths, however, may exist. One may speak truth to power about the constitutional meaning of
equality, the nature of the present ruling coalition, or the toenail lengths of federal judges.
What truths one explores must depend on previous normative commitments that determine
what is important to know and beliefs about what is already known. These beliefs, of course,
should be subject to critical scrutiny as should every other belief, but not all beliefs can be sub-
ject to critical scrutiny at the same time. Given the intense critical scrutiny given to constitu-
tional understandings of equality, the cause of certain understandings of that equality might be
advanced more by greater attention to the present regime's capacity for advancing those under-
standings.
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I. THE POLITICAL USES OF CONSTITUTIONAL EXEGESIS
Equal protection doctrine will be different when I control official
constitutional meanings. My first priority will be socializing the legal
profession.26 Socialization is constitutionally necessary because per-
sons enjoy equal protection of the laws only when all are equally ca-
pable of vindicating their legal rights. Given the overwhelming evi-
dence that access to experienced counsel and other resources used in
litigation substantially affect the capacity to assert, exercise, and de-
fend legal rights,27 equality under the law entails equal capacity to lit-
gate. Moreover, to the extent that judges make as well as apply laws,
principles of democratic equality require that persons have the same
practical opportunity to litigate as they do to speak or vote.2
8
Maimonides suggested two practices for achieving equal justice
among economic un-equals. Judicial disciples attending trials had a
religious obligation to raise every point they believed might favor the
less fortunate litigant.29 Such interventions prevented the powerful
from using their superior legal knowledge and fact-finding abilities to
advantage in the legal process. When rich litigants came to court
dressed to the hilt, they were required either to change into ordinary
clothes or provide the same finery for the other parties before the
judges.0 Judges who could not identify the more affluent party could
not make decisions on the basis of wealth or impressions bought by
wealth.
A constitutional equality in the Maimonidean spirit might insist
that all judicial clerks provide substantial assistance to less fortunate
litigants and that any party attempting to influence the outcome of a
lawsuit by spending more than other parties be required to provide
those parties with the funds necessary to purchase equal or equivalent
legal services. Should IBM hire an entire law firm to defeat a private
suit, the court would order IBM to pay an equivalent law firm to
prosecute that suit. Private parties could spend more money when
they felt doing so would promote a more accurate legal fact-finding.
' For a more elaborate version of the argument in this paragraph, see Mark A. Graber, Law
in the Good Society, 9 THE GOOD Soc'Y 68 (1999).
' The classic article documenting the numerous disadvantages less fortunate persons suffer
in the litigation process is Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974).
" See SUSAN E. LAWRENCE, THE POOR IN COURT: THE LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM AND
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING (1990) 154-58 (stating that poor persons' inability to access
the Court effectively sets parameters on the issues addressed, leaving neglected issues of impor-
tance to poor Americans).
29See MAIMONIDES, THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK FOURTEEN: THE BOOK OFJUDGES 66
(Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1949).
See id. at 63 (commanding ajudge to tell the "well clad" party to either dress like the "ill
clad" party or dress the "ill clad" party like himself).
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That spending, distributed to all parties, would not advantage the
more affluent party in ways unintended by the law.
Elaborating the constitutional and jurisprudential merits of this
argument for equal legal assistance would make sense at a time when
progressives controlled or substantially influenced official constitu-
tional meanings. Following the pattern of many contributions to this
Symposium, my Article would first detail the inadequacies of equal
protection doctrine laid down by the Rehnquist Court, insulting per-
haps the probity or intelligence of the more conservative members of
that tribunal. The Article would then detail previously proposed
progressive rethinkings of equal protection, highlighting in more re-
spectful terms the virtues and difficulties of those efforts. The core of
that piece would explain in elegant detail both the specific justifica-
tions of a Maimonidean understanding of equal protection and the
precise policies that follow from Maimonidean principles. Particular
emphasis would be placed on how my rethinking of equal protection
is actually different from and superior to other progressive ideas.
These arguments might ultimately prove unpersuasive, even in a po-
litical universe where progressives controlled official constitutional
meanings. Still, the progressive members of a hypothetical Wellstone
administration would regard my conclusions as reasonable constitu-
tional ideals worth contemplating. Members of a hypothetical Tush-
net Court would not scoff at my reliance on the "thin Constitution"
set out in the Declaration of Independence.' When progressives
control official constitutional meanings, refining progressive constitu-
tional arguments is a meaningful political project.
Elaborating the constitutional and jurisprudential merits of this
argument for equal legal assistance makes less sense while the
Rehnquist Court sits, George Bush governs, and Republicans control
one House of Congress. Commentaries on Jewish Law are not likely
to provide the magic premises, information, or incantations that
transform crucial members of the ruling center-right coalition into
democratic socialists. Maimonides is also probably not the best
source for arguments that will persuade moderate conservatives to re-
sist calls to reduce present levels of legal assistance. References to the
"thin Constitution" are unacceptable to conservatives in power. My
egalitarian conclusions are an anathema to the present ruling class.
Officials who do not believe that poor persons are entitled to substan-
tial legal assistance are not likely to be persuaded that all persons are
entitled to the same quality legal assistance presently enjoyed by ma-
jor corporations.
Elaborating the Maimonidean understanding of equal protection
also makes little sense as an effort to refine further the progressive
" For Professor Tushnet's elaboration of the "thin Constitution," see MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 9-14 (1999) [hereinafter TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY].
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shadow constitution or constitution-in-exile. Extensive squabbling
over the best justification or form of providing substantially more as-
sistance to less fortunate litigants is a poor use of intellectual energy
at a time when the main issue on the political agenda is how much
legal assistance programs should be cut. The best progressive shadow
constitution might simply declare, "much more help for poorer liti-
gants," leaving to the future the precise dimensions of that help and
the best justification. The differences among progressives that need
debate at present concern the best strategies and rhetoric for pre-
venting less help for poorer litigants.
Progressive rethinkings of other specific areas of equal protection
law or of more general equal protection principles seem no more
pressing than progressive rethinkings of the equal protection rights
of litigants. Thirty years of progressive argument has not had a no-
ticeable influence on Chief Justice Rehnquist or the senior patriarchs
of the Bush dynasty. Thirty more years of progressive argument is not
likely to influence Justice Thomas or the younger scions of the Bush
dynasty. Rather than trying to convince Justice Scalia to think more
like Professor Ronald Dworkin, progressives should spend more en-
ergy doing the political organizing necessary for ensuring that when
Justice Scalia retires he will be replaced by a Justice who thinks more
like Professor Dworkin.2
Elaborating new progressive critiques of Rehnquist Court practice
is at present politically futile. Progressive constitutional argument
reached the point of diminishing political returns in almost every
area of equal protection law more than a decade ago.3 Constitu-
tional theory at the turn of the twenty-first century is saturated with
alternatives to present Fourteenth Amendment doctrine. Those per-
sons who have not yet been persuaded by previously published pro-
gressive claims are not likely to be persuaded by the next refinements
on fairly worn themes. Should progressives take control of the gov-
ernment tomorrow or at some more future point, they will already
have in hand numerous progressive proposals to guide their constitu-
tional decision making. What progressives lack is a constitutional
theory for persons out of power, a constitutional theory that might
inform the present political choices actually open to the democratic
Left.
Cf. MARK A. GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION: EQUAL CHOICE, THE CONSTITUTION, AND
REPRODUCTIVE POLITICS 131 (1996) [hereinafter GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION].
' For a general discussion of "diminished political returns" as applied to progressive consti-
tutional argument, see Mark A. Graber, Social Democracy and Constitutional Theory: An Institu-
tionalAnalysis, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1969 (2001).
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A. Influencing the Official Constitution
Progressive constitutionalists are not likely to convert the
Rehnquist Court, the Bush Administration, and the Republican-
controlled House of Representatives. Bombarded by a steady stream
of progressive law review articles and advocacy, the Supreme Court
has nevertheless been moving consistently in a rightward direction
over the past three decades particularly with respect to the rights of
poor people."5 Justices Thomas and Scalia, undeterred by that bar-
rage of critical commentary, are working hard to convince their
brethren to overrule those liberal precedents that have not been
uisted to serve conservative ends. Justice Thomas, in particular, is
committed to abandoning past judicial decisions providing some con-
stitutional protection for poorer litigants.37 A similar outpouring of
progressive political arguments has not stemmed the conservative
drift of national politics. The elected branches of the federal gov-
ernment are presently controlled by a center-right coalition nearly
identical to that which presently controls the federal judiciary. Indif-
ferent to the disturbing increases in economic inequality over the
past three decades,sM President Bush's proposed budget cuts funds for
the Legal Services Corporation while offering a substantial tax cut to
the most fortunate Americans. Interrupted only occasionally by a
progressive member of Congress making an impassioned speech on
the need for funneling more resources directly to the poor, debate in
Congress focuses almost entirely on the size and distribution of those
cuts.
Progressive constitutionalists participate only at the margins in the
process by which the ruling center-right coalition resolves questions
of constitutional equality. Whether the subject is the tax code, legal
See generally DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST COURT
(1992) (documenting events in and decisions by the Supreme Court from 1986 to 1991).
35 See Mark A. Graber, The Clintonification of Ameaican Law: Abortion, Welfare, and Liberal Con-
stitutional Theory, 58 OHIO ST. LJ. 731, 776-78 (1997) (stating that the Supreme Court has cre-
ated an exclusive body of precedent that is hostile to welfare rights) [hereinafter Graber,
Clntoniylation] .
For Justice Thomas's assault on existing constitutional precedent, see Mark A. Graber,
Clarence Thomas and the Perils of Amateur History, in THE STRUCTURE OF REHNQUIST COURT
JURISPRUDENCE (Earl Maltz ed., forthcoming 2003). Free speech is the one area of constitu-
tional law where past Warren Court precedents seem safe, largely because such precedents can
be used by conservatives to strike down regulations on campaign finance, commercial advertis-
ing, and hate speech. SeeJ.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the
First Amendment 1990 DUKE LJ. 375, 384-87 (1990) (claiming that conservatives have adopted
the traditionally liberal mission to enforce free speech rights because in doing so they support
business interest and conservative interest groups).
See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 139-41 (1996) (Thomas,J., dissenting).
See, e.g., KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR: WEALTH AND THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE IN THE REAGAN AFIEPATH (1991) (stating that the Reagan Administration's eco-
nomic policies led to an income increase for the wealthiest one percent of Americans, while
middle class income stagnated and incomes dropped for many lower-income Americans).
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assistance, or some other matter, the central constitutional choices
inside and outside courts range between moderate-conservative posi-
tions and more extreme conservative positions. Distinctively progres-
sive policies are not among the alternatives seriously being consid-
ered by those national political actors whose votes are likely to
determine legislative, executive, and judicial decisions. The practical
alternatives for legal assistance, for example, are the moderate-
conservative position (held by the American Bar Association), that
some increases in funding are necessary to maintain existing services,
and the more radical-conservative position (held by ideological con-
servatives in the Justice Department and Congress), that federal legal
assistance programs should be abandoned. Debate within the Su-
preme Court for the foreseeable future is over whether the line of
cases beginning with Griffin v. Illinois9 and Douglas v. California"
should be overruled. No substantial expansion of those precedents is
on the judicial horizon, though particularly strict limitations on legal
services may be declared unconstitutional.
Distinctively progressive premises fall on deaf ears during these
debates. Arguments that begin by declaring that democracy requires
substantial economic equality end in failure. Most participants in
public debates over legal assistance and other egalitarian concerns
have been exposed to, and have rejected, that and related progressive
starting points. The consistent failure of such claims to influence na-
tional policy making suggests that the persons who presently control
official constitutional meanings are unwilling to accept any argument
that calls for substantial redistribution of wealth. The problem stems
less from politics defeating principle than from the principles that
animate the present ruling class. No persuasive argument for sub-
stantial redistribution of wealth can probably be made using only
premises and information generally accepted by conservatives. Inevi-
tably, a progressive principle sneaks into the syllogism.42  Mai-
monidean equal protection, for example, assumes a difference be-
tween legal services and consumer goods. Conservatives regard legal
services as another commercial good that ought to be bought and
sold as any other commercial good. The idea that persons should not
be allowed to gain legal advantages from unlimited spending makes
no more sense from this anti-progressive perspective than the idea
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (holding that poor persons have a right to a free transcript when ap-
pealing a criminal conviction).
372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding that poor persons have a right to counsel during mandatory
appeals from a criminal conviction).
"' See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 121 S. Ct. 1043 (2001) (striking down a federal law
banning the Legal Services Corporation from challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws).
42 For instance, think of all the arguments for legal abortion that assume that consenting
adults have the right to engage in sexual intercourse. See generalyJudith Jarvis Thomson, A De-
fense ofAbortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47 (1971).
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that persons should not be allowed to gain political advantages from
unlimited spending.
1. The Justice O'Connor and Justice Kennedy Strategy
Socially liberal policies constitute a partial exception to the de-
pressing constitutional landscape for progressive causes. Possible al-
liances exist with "country-club Republicans," who "identify the claims
made by the organized women's movement with their own class in-
terests."43 These suburban residents, who are conservative on eco-
nomic issues, want their daughters to have successful careers, recog-
nize that birth control and abortion services may be necessary for
those careers, think that sexual orientation is largely a matter of pri-
vate choice, and generally hope that religion plays a limited role in
public life. Justices Blackmun and Powell clearly fit the profile of
country-club Republicans." So do Justices O'Connor, Souter, and
Kennedy.5 Many legislative and executive officials in the ruling cen
ter-right coalition similarly combine economic conservatism with
mild social liberalism. When redistributive issues are not on the ta-
ble, progressives and economic conservatives sometimes join forces to
defeat social conservatives eager to regulate sexual behavior in the
name of religious norms. These alliances explain why, at a time when
the United States became more conservative economically, the sexual
revolution was largely institutionalized. Perhaps progressive consti-
tutional theory should take this political reality into account and pri-
marily pitch arguments at Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and
other country-club Republicans with moderately liberal social ten-
dencies.
Progressives writing for this small but influential audience 47 should
nevertheless understand the limited nature of any coalition with the
suburban wing of the Republican party. Country-club Republicans
call the shots in this relationship. Their control serves to wall social
liberalism off from economic liberalism. Even if the principles un-
derlying the best justification for keeping abortion legal and banning
discrimination based on sexual orientation also mandate substantial
economic redistribution, suburban members of the present center-
right regime do not come to this conclusion. The distinctive political
and constitutional problems of the poor are not going to be ad-
TAKING THE CONSTITUYTION AWAY, supra note 31, at 148.
" See id at 148-49 (describing how the careers ofJustices Blackmun and Powell classify them
as countr)club Republicans).
' Cf id. at 156-57 (discussing the belief ofJustices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy that Roe
v. Wade, "while perhaps wrong when decided, [has] become so entrenched in our constitutional
scheme that it cannot be abandoned").
See Graber, Clintonification, supra note 35, at 804-13.
,' The seminal article in this tradition is Susan R. Estrich & Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion
Politics: Writingfor an Audence of One 138 U. PA. L. REV. 119 (1989).
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dressed by the present ruling coalition. Additional analysis of that in-
justice is not likely to remedy the problem.
Progressives and moderate conservatives may find a broader
common commitment to maintaining the present constitutional
status quo. Progressives favor maintaining the status quo because for
the short term the practical political alternatives are much worse.
Country-club Republicans (and Democrats) favor maintaining the
constitutional status quo because, after at least two decades of rule by
a center-right coalition, the constitutional status quo on virtually all
matters reflects country-club conservative values. The Chamber of
Commerce has little quarrel with the modem welfare state as that
481state has evolved in the last generation. Members are not likely to
complain about, and may even support, Supreme Court decisions
that make executing the mentally retarded a bit more difficult, rein
in particularly egregious prosecutorial practices, retain bans on offi-
cial prayer in public schools, give the federal government some
power to prevent discrimination against the disabled, and reject con-
stitutional claims based on the Second Amendment. Progressive con-
stitutional theorists might see their role in the short run as helping
these moderate conservatives find arguments that will convince Jus-
tices O'Connor and Kennedy to maintain most existing precedents,
and convince other country-club Republicans in the elected branches
of the national government to maintain the constitutional status quo.
These progressive attempts to speak seriously to the center-right
confront several difficulties. Persuasive efforts may be superfluous.
The United States presently faces no shortage of intelligent lawyers
who are country-club Republicans (or Democrats) that might require
progressives to fill an intellectual void. Presumably, center-right law
professors and lawyers are likely to make better and more persuasive
moderate conservative arguments than progressive scholars. Persua-
sive efforts may also not be believable. Members of the center-right
coalition have good reason for doubting whether progressives will
continue to sound so moderate when the Left gains more power to
control official constitutional meanings. Finally, persuasive efforts
may weaken long-term progressive goals. Arguments that might pre-
vent more conservative judicial decisions might also foreclose more
liberal movement in the near future.
The constitutional arguments that best justify maintaining a line
of precedents are not those that best justify expanding that line of
precedents. Justices Kennedy and O'Connor will instinctively recoil
from any defense of the Griffin line of cases or any other liberal
precedent that explicitly, obviously, or even possibly, provides strong
grounds for expanding those holdings in the future. The arguments
most likely to appeal to those moderate conservatives are claims that
' See TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 31, at 148 (noting that "countr)-club Re-
publicans.., accepted the basic contours of the New Deal and the welfare state .... ).
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will limit future judicial capacity to move in both liberal and more
conservative directions. The difficult question progressive theorists
confront is whether to advance doctrines that might persuade mod-
erate conservatives to maintain existing rights for poor people at the
cost of including language that might limit the capacity of future
progressive Justices to expand those rights.
Judicial minimalism highlights some advantages and disadvan-
tages with progressive strategies for finding common ground with the
moderate right. Cass Sunstein and other proponents of this ap-
proach to the judicial function claim that the Supreme Court should
generally resolve constitutional cases on the narrowest possible
grounds, both in terms of the actual issues decided and the justifica-
tion for the decision. Such progressive calls for judicial minimalism
presently have several political virtues.49 Judicial minimalism appeals
to crucial swing Justices on the Supreme Court. Unlike distinctively
progressive claims, calls for courts to decide cases narrowly have his-
torically echoed across the political spectrum. Whether 'Judicial
minimalism has been the most striking feature of American law in the
1990s" ° is open to doubt, butJustice Thomas andJustice Scalia have
so far failed to convince the more moderate conservatives on the
bench to abandon completely past progressive decisions, however
those decisions have been watered down. Justice O'Connor in par-
ticular, is typically reluctant to make bold judicial pronouncementsY
Progressives should do what they can to buttress her reluctance, given
the probability that a more assertive Justice O'Connor is likely to have
more sympathy for the political Right than for the political Left.
Progressives for the foreseeable future should "prefer to leave fun-
damental issues undecided,"5 2 both inside and outside the Court.
The more constitutional questions left open for the foreseeable fu-
ture, the less precedent the next progressive Court will have to over-
rule. Progressives who foreswear broad judicial decisions are sacrific-
ing nothing of present value. Broad judicial decisions for the next
few years will be broad conservative decisions, decisions striking down
all affirmative action plans or all legal assistance to civil litigants. Fi-
nally, judicial minimalism serves as a healthy reminder that progres-
sives will presently win constitutional victories inside and outside the
courts only if their claims can be couched in the narrowest possible
terms. Moderate conservatives who cannot be persuaded to make the
"9 The following discussion of the political virtues of minimalism does not impugn the intel-
lectual sincerity of any scholar who advocates that approach to the judicial function. As noted
above, purely tactical uses of minimalism are probably not believable.
" CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT xi
(1999).
See id. at xiii.
I&. at Y.
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legal system more egalitarian in practice might be persuaded that a
particular party has a right to a particular form of legal assistance.s
3
Progressives prepared to jump on the minimalist bandwagon
should look at how such decisions may buttress the present regime
before they leap. Just as minimalist decisions during the 1970s strik-
ing down particularly egregious forms of discrimination against
women weakened support for the Equal Rights Amendment," so
minimalist decisions striking down individual death sentences and
providing narrowly targeted forms of assistance to less fortunate civil
litigants may weaken support for abandoning capital punishment and
substantially reducing the role wealth plays in the legal process. Such
decisions may assure interested citizens that the criminal and civiljus-
tice systems are fundamentally fair when, in fact, only stunning gross
injustices are remedied. The minimalism ofJustice O'Connor and, to
a lesser extent, Justice Kennedy, may play a vital role in sanitizing the
present regime. By voting to strike down unpopular limits on abor-
tion, gross discriminations against homosexuals, and other violations
of equality that offend middle-class sensibilities, moderate conserva-
tives contain political forces that might otherwise mobilize against the
ruling center-right coalition.
Minimalism may be directed at all constitutionalists, but the pri-
mary audience for Cass Sunstein's writings are persons whose lean-
ings are center-left. Conservative understandings of the judicial func-
tion are more likely influenced by such conservative thinkers as
Michael McConnell than by jurists on the editorial board of The
American Prospect. Should Sunstein successfully persuade many read-
ers, the most likely outcome is that the next generation of potential
progressive Justices will be committed to some version of judicial
minimalism. Debate over judicial minimalism should, therefore, be
one of the central debates associated with progressive shadow consti-
tutions. This debate is over what progressives should do when in
power, and is not about how to influence the suburban conservatives
who govern at present. Progressives participating in this conversation
should remember that our willingness to be minimalists when we
control official constitutional meanings does not mean that conserva-
This progressive reality suggests that Sunstein may be wrong when he claims that the
more liberal wing of the present Court is in principle more minimalist that the more conserva-
tive wing. See id. at xiii. The difference between Justices Scalia and Ginsburg may simply be that
Justice Scalia believes he might be able to obtain maximalist conservative decisions, while Jus-
tice Ginsburg knows she cannot obtain maximalist liberal decisions. The minimalism of the
liberal wing of the Court can only be measured when a stronger liberal majority forms on the
federal bench.
SeeJANEJ. MANSBRIDGE, WHYWE LOST THE ERA 45-47 (1986); see also Mark A. Graber, Our
(Im)Perfect Constitution, 51 REv. POL. 86, 95-96 (1989) (citing various equal protection gains
made by women in the years leading up to the defeat of the Equal Rights Amendment).
[Vol. 4:2
RETHINKING EQUAL PROTECTION
tives will be minimalists when they control official constitutional
meanings.55
2. The Senator Kennedy Strategy
Progressive constitutional theorists are better advised to help Sena-
tor Kennedy than Justice Kennedy in making constitutional choices.
Senator Kennedy and other progressive officials in Congress are far
more likely than country-club Republicans to be influenced by consti-
tutionalists who identify with the Left. Liberal Democrats presently
lack the power necessary to make their constitutional vision the fun-
damental law of the land. They may, however, be able to influence
official constitutional meanings at the margin by taking advantage of
the filibuster and other legislative practices that permit cohesive mi-
norities in the national legislature to exercise some influence on pub-
lic policy. Some constitutional openings may be determined solely by
political possibility. Senator Kennedy may find that forty-one Sena-
tors are willing to filibuster against a bill banning abortion, but that
only thirty Senators will support a filibuster against a bill reducing as-
sistance to poor civil litigants. Other constitutional openings may re-
quire progressives to decide on the lesser of two evils. Liberal Demo-
crats may be able to restore some funding for abortion or legal
assistance, but not both. Senator Kennedy and his political allies may
need some standards for determining when a judicial or executive
nominee is too conservative.
Present constitutional theory says almost nothing that helps per-
sons with relatively disfavored political ideas determine how to exer-
cise their very limited power to influence official constitutional mean-
ings. Persons out of power require a constitutional theory that makes
gradations among constitutional injustices rather than one that
merely identifies constitutional injustices. Little such theory exists at
present. Senator Kennedy will find the law reviews a useful source of
constitutional guidance when he symbolically proposes a bill banning
capital punishment. The Senator will find almost no useful material
in legal journals when he is deciding which provisions of a Republi-
can bill on the death penalty he should spend the most energy de-
feating. Should he use his limited influence to make the capital sen-
tencing process more consistent with progressive understandings of
the rights of indigent criminal defendants or with progressive under-
standings of the rights of racial minorities? Progressive constitutional
theory provides no answers. Senator Kennedy during various confir-
mation debates will be able to filibuster for decades reading progres-
"5 Cf LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 220 (1985) (stating that progressives
"should not be lulled into the belief that, if we but embrace neutrality [in free speech cases] for
those who would exterminate some among us, its shield will automatically be available to pro-
tect us when it is wewho cry for help").
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sive arguments for maintaining legal abortion. He will also be able to
deliver long orations on why the Constitution, properly interpreted,
permits the federal government to ban handguns near schools. The
Senator will be reduced to silence when asked by colleagues to ex-
pound on whether progressive constitutionalists would prefer a us-
tice willing to overrule both Roe v. Wade5W 6 and United States v. Lopez or
ajustice who would treat both decisions as good law.
Constitutional theory presently fails to help anyone establish con-
stitutional priorities because constitutional discourse typically works
within only two categories: constitutional and unconstitutional. Vir-
tually no language exists for constitutionally evaluating practices that
are in the same category. No good constitutional standards exist, for
example, for determining whether segregated schools were a "worse"
constitutional violation than the Alien and Sedition Acts. Practices in
the constitutional category do admit of gradation based on wisdom.
Not everything constitutional, theorists admit, is wise. Justice Felix
Frankfurter noted that "preoccupation by our people with the consti-
tutionality, instead of the wisdom, of legislation or of executive action
is preoccupation with a false value.""' The unconstitutional category
admits of no gradation. Common sense does provide some distinc-
tions between constitutional wrongs. Proponents of a strict separa-
tion between church and state can distinguish between Christmas
trees in public places and the Spanish Inquisition. Still, little in con-
stitutional theory provides standards for evaluating the severity of
constitutional violations when common sense runs out.
This failure to establish constitutional priorities is probably an-
other consequence of the Court-centeredness of much constitutional
thought. Justices, according to much constitutional wisdom, need
not concern themselves with the severity of constitutional violations.
Harmless error and justiciability issues aside, Justices are supposed to
declare unconstitutional all government practices they believe to be
unconstitutional, or clearly unconstitutional. Justice Scalia is not ex-
pected to reach an arrangement with Justice Souter whereby the for-
mer agrees against his better judgment to declare unconstitutional
prayer at public high school graduations while the latter agrees
against his betterjudgment to sustain prayer at public college gradua-
tions. While some negotiation within a particular doctrinal space
may be acceptable to obtain a majority or supermajority, 9 interdoc-
trinal deals are strictly forbidden. The Supreme Court, Earl Warren
" 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding that the right to have an abortion is a fundamental right
protected under the Due Process Clause).
" 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), forbidding individuals from know-
ingly possessing firearms in a school zone, exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power).
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 555 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
" See Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 982,




declared, is not the place where one "tak[es] half a loaf where a
whole loaf could not be obtained."' ° Justice Brennan is not expected
to trade his vote in flag burning cases for Justice Rehnquist's vote in
death penalty cases. Justices call them as they see them.
Elected officials are not similarly situated, either in theory or prac-
tice. Log-rolling and mutual accommodation are considered legiti-
mate legislative options. Executives and legislators trade votes both
on such non-constitutional matters as the best location for military
bases1 and on such constitutional matters as campaign finance re-
form. Moreover, the structure of legislative decision making virtually
requires elected officials to make constitutional compromises. Jus-
tices typically vote on constitutional issues separately. Legislators fre-
quently vote on bills that contain numerous contested provisions.
Should all national officials automatically oppose any bill they believe
has at least one unconstitutional feature, Congress might not be able
to pass any legislation on some matters, even matters on which many
legislators believe the status quo unconstitutional. Decisions con-
cerning the staffing of the national government require an even
greater degree of constitutional accommodation. Presidents might
not be able to make any appointments, almost certainly not any sig-
nificant appointments, and certainly not any appointments to the
Department ofJustice or federal judiciary if all Senators felt obligated
to support filibusters rather than confirm any official believed to hold
at least one mistaken constitutional notion. Given the occasional dis-
agreements among such ideologically similar Justices as Marshall and
Brennan, or Thomas and Scalia, Senators who resolved never to sup-
port a nominee with whom they have any constitutional disagreement
will probably only be able to vote to confirm themselves. Thus, the
very nature of the legislative process requires elected officials to es-
tablish constitutional priorities. The more limited an official's capac-
ity to influence official constitutional meanings, the more vital the
ordering of constitutional values. One such ordering might regard
the use federal funds by religious organizations as a tolerable consti-
tutional injustice, attacks on legal abortion as a constitutional injus-
tice that should be opposed, and executions as a constitutional injus-
tice that should be opposed by all constitutional means.
The Democratic Party, and possibly progressive constitutionalists,
have apparently reached a consensus on constitutional priorities in
the absence of any theorizing on the subject. That coalition's fun-
damental constitutional commitment is maintaining Roe v. Wade.62
EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 6 (1977). See also LOUIS FISHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 10 (1988) (criticizing the
Justices' compromise of position).
' Professor Sotirios Barber, however, will be the first to point out that legislators have a con-
stitutional obligation to establish military bases in places that will best serve the national inter-
est. SOTIRIOSA. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 97-98 (1984).
410 U.S. 113 (1973). The argument in this paragraph is detailed at length in Graber,
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The political Left demands that Republican appointees promise to
respect reproductive liberties, but rarely seeks to extract pledges on
other progressive constitutional concerns. Abortion has become the
constitutional priority of the Democratic Party even though no liberal
constitutional theorist has explained why reproductive rights are con-
stitutionally more important or more firmly grounded in the Consti-
tution than other rights that progressive constitutional theorists have
advanced. Abortion has become the first priority of legal liberals
even though virtually all progressive and liberal moral theorists be-
lieve the morality of abortion is far more contestable than the moral-
ity of greater redistributive policies for the poor. The abortion right
is now the Left's "darling privilege"63 even though the primary sup-
porters of abortion rights are affluent Americans, not the poorer citi-
zens the Democratic party and progressives claim to represent.
Those politicians and interest groups will, if pressed, doubtlessly
be able to offer good reasons for their insistence that Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft pledge to respect abortion rights but not the rights of
poor litigants. The abortion right may be the only progressive free-
dom that can be sustained in the present political environment. Le-
gal abortion primarily benefits poor persons, who before Roe were
unable to obtain safe or legal terminations of their pregnancies.
These claims, however, require debate. If progressives may only ex-
ercise a limited degree of influence over official constitutional mean-
ings at present, then the most constructive constitutional debate pro-
gressives can have among themselves is over what progressive
constitutional concerns are most pressing and not over the precise
details of the shadow constitution. Perhaps agreement on a different
ordering of constitutional values will emerge, one that more explicitly
measures constitutional injustice by impact on the poorest Ameri-
cans.
3. The Vermont Strategy
Progressive advocacy does influence official constitutional mean-
ings that fall under the radar of Congress and the Supreme Court.
Progressive lower federal court judges are often able to escape direct
Supreme Court supervision,65 progressive state court judges play im-
portant roles on many state benches, and progressive elected officials
play active roles in many state governments. Pitching progressive
Clintonification, supra note 35, at 731-80.
"The phrase is shamelessly lifted from MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S
DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2000).
See GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 32, at 66-68.
See generally Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AM. POL SC.
REv. 1017 (1959) (detailing how lower courts use procedural or interpretive devices to circum-
vent general policies advanced by Supreme Court decisions).
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constitutional arguments to these officials makes good sense.6 Pro-
gressive state courts and legislatures may presently serve both as labo-
ratories of progressive democracy, where different progressive theo-
ries may be tested in practice, and as sources of precedent when
progressives again control official national constitutional meanings.
Vermont seems a particularly good site for progressive advocacy.
The state is presently represented in the Senate by Patrick Leahy, a
liberal Democrat, James Jeffords, a liberal independent, and in the
House of Representatives by Bernard Sanders, the only Socialist
member of Congress.6 ' The Vermont Supreme Court has insisted
that gay couples enjoy the same benefits as married persons,"s the
Vermont state legislature passed a law recognizing such civil unions,
and Governor Howard Dean defended that measure during his suc-
cessful reelection campaign.69 Clearly Vermonters are open to pro-
gressive arguments that are failing on the national level. Recent state
constitutional precedents, made both inside and outside of courts,7
provide solid legal and political foundations for expanding progres-
sive constitutionalism in that jurisdiction. Progressives who wish to
defend Maimonidean equal protection or similar measures might
think locally, making arguments that rely on Vermont's distinctive
constitutional heritage and practice or the distinctive constitutional
heritage and practice of a similarly progressive state.
The market for constitutional theory, alas, does not favor the
Vermont strategy. Progressive and other constitutional theorists find
prominent outlets for their thoughts when they seek to instruct the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court, not the justices who sit
on the Supreme Court of Vermont. Progressives in states must
largely fend for themselves with little help from constitutional theo-
rists seeking national prominence. Interestingly, the insulting tone of
much progressive theory suggests that most progressive theorists
71agree that the nattering at the Rehnquist Court is a hopeless cause.
The goal of progressive constitutional theory, this practice suggests, is
to instruct progressives on what they should do at the future time
when progressives control or substantially influence official national
constitutional meanings.
" The classic article is WilliamJ. Brennan Jr., State Constitutions and the Protections of Individ-
ualRights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489 (1977) (describingjudicial and legislative measures sensitive to
progressive needs).
67 SeeLizette Alvarez, A Senator's UnaccustomedLimehgh N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2001, atA18.
= Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
See Christopher Graff, Civil Unions Debate Voted Vernwnt's Top Story of 2000, ASSOCIATED
PRESS ST. & LOC. WIRE, Dec. 25, 2000.
' Perhaps Governor Dean's reelection in Vermont is part of a state constitutional moment
that endorses civil unions. See generally ACKIRMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 23 (discussing the
concept of constitutional moments).
" SeeTAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 31, at 155-57.
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Sweden is an alternative for progressives unsatisfied with the local
option. Many nations have more liberal constitutions and more lib-
eral constitutional decisionmakers than the United States. Argu-
ments that do not move ChiefJustice Rehnquist may tilt the Supreme
Court of Sweden or other Western European nations in more pro-
gressive directions. Significantly, Sweden and many other nations
have a real tradition of democratic socialism, not one that has to be
manufactured by placing selective quotations out of context in a legal
brief or, too often, in a law review article. Given the relative success
of Western Europeans (and Vermonters) at instituting progressive
policies, however, nationally-oriented American constitutional theo-
rists might be better advised to learn what progressives in those juris-
dictions did, or are doing, right than suggest that more successful so-
cial democrats elsewhere should adopt strategies that have failed in
the United States.
B. The Shadow Constitution
Progressive arguments for equalizing legal assistance and similar
progressive claims are best understood as constructing shadow consti-
tutions or constitutions-in-exile. Parties out of power in many nations
form shadow cabinets. These bodies consist of the persons who
might hold various executive offices when that coalition gains control
of the government.72  The American equivalent apparently is the
shadow constitution. Scholars out of power in the United States
author various shadow constitutions that detail the constitutional
meanings that might become the fundamental law of the land should
the author's preferred coalition gain control of the federal govern-
ment.3 Proposed amendments to the progressive shadow constitu-
tion are aimed primarily at progressives, who might be persuaded
that newer progressive arguments advance better policies and justifi-
cations than older progressive arguments. For instance, Deborah
Rhode has just published a wonderful book arguing for substantial
increases in legal assistance.74 Maimonidean equal protection might
be considered a minor revision or a supplement to this version of the
progressive shadow constitution.
Progressive refinements of the progressive shadow constitution as-
sume the shadow constitution should mirror the official constitution,
much as the shadow cabinet mirrors the official cabinet. The official
See, e.g., Chris Parkin, Dublin Shadow Cabinet Named, PRESS ASS'N, Feb. 15, 2001; Czech Re-
public: Czech Opposition Alliance To Present "Shadow Cabinet" in Apri4 IPR STRATEGIC BUS. INFO.
DATABASE, Mar. 21, 2001.
" Just as more than one shadow cabinet can exist in a nation, so may countries have more
than one shadow constitution. See New Shadow Cabinets Grow in Number, IPR STRATEGIC Bus.
INFO. DATABASE, Dec. 26, 2000.




cabinet has a Minister of the Interior, so the shadow cabinet has a
shadow Minister of the Interior. The Rehnquist Court articulates the
official understanding of equal protection, so persons constructing
the shadow constitutions articulate alternative understandings of
equal protection. If members of the party out of power debate with
the same intensity who ought to be the shadow Minister of Justice as
members of the party in power debate who ought to be the official
Minister of Justice, then members of the party out of power ought to
debate with the same intensity the legal assistance fights recognized
by the shadow constitution as members of the party in power debate
the legal assistance rights recognized by the official constitution. In
short, constitutional analysis done by persons out of power ought to
be identical to constitutional analysis done by persons in power. The
only difference between official cabinets or constitutions and shadow
cabinets or constitutions is that the former lay down the present law
of the land while the latter articulate proposals for the future.
This "shadow" metaphor and practice obscures how constitutional
theory might be influenced by the different responsibilities of, and
opportunities before, persons in and out of power. Persons in power
are responsible for determining official constitutional meanings.
They decide whether the constitution will presently be interpreted as
guaranteeing poor persons various rights to assistance in civil cases.
Constitutional theorists who are generally sympathetic to the ruling
center-ight coalition have the opportunity to influence the choices
government officials will make when deciding that and other consti-
tutional matters. The precise differences between alternative conser-
vative constitutional understandings really matter at present. When
making authoritative constitutional decisions, government officials
will be choosing between different conservative constitutional visions
or creating a new conservative synthesis. Persons out of power are
not responsible for determining official constitutional meanings.
They do not get to decide whether the Constitution will presently be
interpreted as guaranteeing poor persons various rights to assistance
in civil cases. Rather, the responsibility of the opposition party is to
explain why the governing coalition's principles and policies are
wrong. This critical function rarely requires choosing between spe-
cific alternatives. Progressives can demonstrate that existing legal as-
sistance policies are woefully inadequate without deciding whether
Professor Rhode's proposals are more attractive than Mamonidean
equal protection. The precise differences between these and other
proposed progressive understandings of constitutional equality are
not of immediate concern because they are not on the present politi-
cal agenda.
Constitutionalists in power often face specific constitutional deci-
sions that constitutionalists out of power are able to avoid. The Re-
publicans in Congress will soon vote on what they believe is an ap-
propriate level of legal assistance. The persons who vote for that
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budget will vote for a specific dollar figure to be given annually to the
Legal Services Corporation.75 Progressive legislators are free to claim
only that Republican proposals are inadequate, without revealing
their ideal funding levels. Justices O'Connor and Kennedy will soon
have to determine what forms of legal assistance the Constitution re-
quires be provided to poor civil litigants. Progressives on the federal
bench are unlikely to be confronted with a case in the foreseeable fu-
ture that requires them to think about their ideal level of legal assis-
tance. Justice Breyer can simply declare that the Constitution re-
quires at least as much as existing precedent without detailing how
much more he would insist on were four other Justices to share his
constitutional vision.
The federal judicial appointment process provides another exam-
ple of the different constitutional judgments required of official con-
stitutional interpreters and persons constructing a shadow constitu-
tion. When a vacancy occurs on the Supreme Court, the President
and his advisors will determine which specific jurist they will nomi-
nate for that tribunal. They will be unable to claim, as candidate
Bush could, that they will appoint only "compassionate conservatives"
or Justices similar to Justice Scalia. President Bush will not be able
simply to list ten names he thinks should be considered for any judi-
cial vacancy. His Administration will have to select a specific nomi-
nee. Progressives will not be similarly compelled to decide who is the
best person to fill that judicial vacancy. That choice will not be theirs
to make. Persons on the Left do not have to consider whether they
preferJustices more like Justice Brennan orJustice Ginsburg; a sitting
federal judge or a professor; Kathleen M. Sullivan or Cass Sunstein.
The Bush Administration will have to make all the analogous choices.
Only persons who control official constitutional meanings are com-
pelled by their office to make specific constitutional choices. Persons
out of power have to determine only whether they will oppose that
choice. They might suggest an alternative, a "shadow justice." They
might also rest content with declaring a nominee "too conservative."
Cluttering a shadow constitution with excessive detail may be un-
wise as well as unnecessary. Conservative efforts to get the details of
the official constitution right make far more sense than analogous
progressive efforts. Conservatives have far greater capacity to get cru-
cial present details right than progressives have to get future, possibly
distant future, details right. Persons with the power to determine of-
ficial constitutional meanings make present constitutional choices in
light of present information. Conservatives constructing the official
constitution act more easily on, and are better positioned to deter-
mine, their political window of opportunity, the relevant legal mate-
rials, and the probabilities that certain policies will actually secure




conservative constitutional ends. A shadow constitution essentially
declares, on the basis of information presently at hand, what persons
out of power will do in the future when they secure power. A very
high probability exists that numerous provisions of the progressive
shadow constitution will be outdated by the time progressives take of-
fice.
Conservatives constructing the official constitution are better posi-
tioned to assess their political window of opportunity than progres-
sives constructing their shadow constitution. President Bush has at-
tained, or should be able to attain, information for determining the
political possibility and costs of proposing to eliminate all funding for
legal aid or nominating a Justice committed to overruling Roe v.
Wade. The Supreme Court is similarly positioned to assess the pres-
ent political response to a decision overruling the Griffin line of cases.
Republicans may misguess. Still, President Bush and Chief Justice
Rehnquist in 2002 are far better able to determine the political re-
sponse to conservative policies and decisions handed down in 2002
than progressives in 2002 are able to determine the political response
to progressive policies and decisions made at some unknowable point
in the future. What will be politically possible for the next successful
progressive coalition depends on those presently unknown political
factors that will propel progressives to power. We simply do not know
whether the next progressive President will have the political support
necessary to nominate a Laurence Tribe to the Supreme Court, or
whether the political costs of a successful Tribe nomination would
outweigh the benefits. How much political capital the next progres-
sive president will have to spend eliminating capital punishment is
similarly unknown.
Conservatives constructing the official constitution are also better
positioned to assess what is legally possible than progressives fashion-
ing a shadow constitution. WhenJustice O'Connor considers in 2002
whether to support Justice Thomas' crusade to overrule the Griffin
line of cases, she will be able to make that decision in light of all the
relevant legal materials available in 2002. Conservative constitutional
commentators are almost as well off. The universe of relevant legal
materials is not likely to expand considerably between the time a con-
servative publishes a law review article on legal assistance and the
time the Supreme Court hears its next case on legal assistance.
Hence, that commentator can, with a high degree of certainty, ana-
lyze virtually all of the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, ju-
dicial precedents, and other legal sources that might influence the
judicial decision. Progressive commentators writing articles directed
at future progressive Justices cannot be nearly as confident that they
are analyzing the material that will be relevant when a progressive ju-
dicial majority analyzes constitutional rights to legal assistance. The
more the progressive shadow constitution is rooted in a detailed exe-
gesis of present legal materials, the more likely such a constitution
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will be dated when progressives take political office. Consider a law
review article whose crucial premise is that the Supreme Court has
not yet explicitly ruled on whether poor persons ever have a right to a
state-funded private detective. This claim is presently true. Before
progressives gain a judicial majority, however, that matter might be
decided adversely to the claim of constitutional right. When similar
litigation came before the newly constituted progressive bench the
issue would not be, as the law review claimed, whether Giffin should
be extended, but whether the subsequent offending case should be
overruled. Other political developments may similarly influence the
constitutional status of certain arguments. To the extent that actual
practice is relevant, the actual practice may change. New statutes may
be passed. Scholars may find new evidence concerning the original
understanding of constitutional provisions. A constitutional amend-
ment may even be passed. Virtually all progressive defenses of state
funding for abortion would be irrelevant should the Constitution be
amended to include an explicit ban on state-funded abortions.
Conservatives constructing an official constitution are better able
to assess the present normative costs and benefits of constitutional
proposals than progressives constructing a shadow constitution.
When President Bush in 2002 decides whether to cut funding for le-
gal services, he has at his disposal all the evidence available at the
time of his decision for determining the impact of those cuts on the
legal system. Progressives writing for the future cannot be as confi-
dent that they have at their disposal all the information that will be
relevant for determining the impact of their proposals at the time
when those proposals might actually become law. Some provisions in
shadow constitutions may be immune to change over time. Just as
Kant believed that all murderers should be executed regardless of the
costs and benefits, 6 so some progressive opponents of capital pun-
ishment may believe that the Supreme Court should declare capital
punishment unconstitutional even if no one is about to be executed
or if undisputed evidence demonstrates that capital punishment de-
ters numerous murderers. Progressives of a more pragmatic bent
may, however, adjust constitutional beliefs and priorities as new evi-
dence emerges. Proof that capital punishment actually saves many
lives and improves living conditions in poor communities may con-
vince some persons that a more fairly administered death penalty
would be constitutional. Likewise, if juries begin consistently hand-
ing down huge verdicts against parties to lawsuits who spend exces-
sively in litigation, providing legal assistance to poor litigants may be-
come unnecessary. More generally, any provision in the progressive
shadow constitution that is partly dependent upon present under-
standings of various policies is vulnerable to changes in those under-




standings. The more pragmatic the provisions of the progressive
shadow constitution, the more likely the argument will be out of date
when progressives control official constitutional meanings.
Constitutional theorizing aimed at influencing current official
constitutional meanings requires more thorough analysis than consti-
tutional theory aimed at the distant future. The cost of mistake is
higher when constructing an official constitution than when fashion-
ing a shadow constitution. When persons in power make mistakes,
society suffers the consequences. If conservative educators imple-
ment policies concerned with teenage sexuality that result in in-
creased abortions, then the community is worse off as measured by
conservative principles. Hence, conservatives in power have very
good reasons for thinking carefully about what policies in practice ac-
tually promote conservative reproductive goals. Shadow constitu-
tions, on the other hand, are mere proposals. When the persons
fashioning them make mistakes, the only present harm is to their
reputation. If one goal of progressive constitutionalism is promoting
greater redistribution and progressive taxes will make everyone worse
off, no actual harm occurs as measured by progressive standards
while progressives are out of power. Progressive tax proposals will be
rejected. Progressives have to be sure they are right about progres-
sive taxation only when in office. The judicial nominations process
provides a clearer example of the different costs of mistake. Ajustice
placed on the bench by a conservative administration who turns into
a liberal over the next four years is a disaster. A Justice suggested by
liberals who turns into a conservative over the next four years is just
an embarrassment.
The different places conservatives and progressives occupy in the
present political universe suggests that constitutional theorizing is no
exception to the general rule that appropriate political behavior de-
pends on the actor's relation to the present regime. Conservative
Republicans have the power to influence present constitutional
meanings. Their constitutional theories appropriately consider in
elaborate detail the possibilities that are politically feasible, whether
such possibilities can be justified legally, and which of those possibili-
ties best serve conservative principles. Progressives may only have the
power to influence official constitutional meanings in the distant fu-
ture. They cannot tell which progressive proposals will be politically
feasible at that time, which will be justified legally, and which will best
serve progressive principles. Hence, while the party in power needs
to advance detailed constitutional proposals, the party out of power is
best off simply advancing general principles, leaving the details until
that time when they can be reasonably assessed.
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C. Imminent or Distant
Whether progressives should construct elaborate shadow constitu-
tions largely depends on whether progressives are likely to achieve
substantial power in the near future. Progressives will need well
specified constitutional theories should the next round of national
elections bring to power a left or center-left coalition. The excruciat-
ing closeness of the 2000 presidential election combined with a razor-
thin Republican margin in the House of Representatives suggest the
reasonable probability of a more progressive ruling coalition by 2004.
This coalition will need progressive doctrine at hand to govern. Tra-
ditional constitutional doctrinal analysis seems less pressing to the ex-
tent that the center-right coalition is fairly durable. That the Demo-
crats might win in 2002 and 2004 does not entail that the Left will
govern. The years 1993 and 1994 were not successful for progressives
even though Democrats controlled all of the elected parts of the fed-
eral government. American politics may be presently structured in
ways that will require substantial political change for progressives to
influence official constitutional meanings. To the extent such
changes are necessary, detailed progressive shadow constitutions
drafted in the present are likely to be dated by the time they might
influence official constitutional meanings in the future.
Two prominent theories of American constitutional development
articulate these different understandings of progressive political pos-
sibilities. Bruce Ackerman's writings maintain that the American
constitutional order is still defined by commitments made during the
Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the heyday of the Civil Rights
Movement. In his view, the Reagan Administration's failure to consti-
tutionalize conservative political visions demonstrates the vitality of
both progressive constitutional visions and progressive constitutional
politics. Philip A. Klinkner and Rogers M. Smith maintain that
Americans have largely abandoned commitments to racial equality
made during the 1960s. The Reagan Revolution, in their view, is part
of an enduring cycle in American politics where short periods of
sharp gains in racial equality are followed by quite lengthy periods of
renewed inequalities. Whereas Ackerman sees renewed commit-
ments to the aspirations of the Civil Rights Movement as politically
possible within the present political system, Klinkner and Smith sug-
gest that political conditions in the United States will have to change
substantially for progressives to be re-empowered.
1. Ackerman's Optimism
Bruce Ackerman regards constitutional politics in the United
States as structured by a series of major, constitutional moments, most
notably the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal, as well as
by some minor constitutional moments, the Civil Rights Era being the
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best example." During these periods of intense constitutional de-
bate, an aroused citizenry demonstrates a clear preference for one al-
ternative in a very well defined constitutional controversy. That pref-
erence may or may not be expressed by a constitutional amendment
ratified under the rules set out in Article 5 of the Constitution. What
matters is that proponents of a particular constitutional vision are
able to overcome all opposition to their political program by earning
the overwhelming public support necessary to exercise decisive con-
trol over all three branches of the national government. This control
enables those advocates to establish their popularly supported vision
as the fundamental law of the land. The responsibility of the Su-
preme Court and other constitutional authorities during periods of
normal politics is to interpret the Constitution consistently with the
people's wishes during their moments of political engagement and
not to permit elected officials to challenge those wishes during times
of public quiescence.
The present constitutional order, Ackerman insists, remains nor-
matively committed to progressive constitutional values.78 Proponents
of the Civil Rights Movement during the 1960s enjoyed the public
support necessary to gain the overwhelming majorities in all branches
of the national government that enabled them to incorporate their
visions into the Constitution. Congress passed the Civil Rights and
Voting Rights Acts by decisive majorities, President Johnson enthusi-
astically signed those bills into law, and the Supreme Court unani-
mously declared the measures constitutional. That the Civil Rights
Movement embodied its vision in statutes rather than constitutional
amendments is of no constitutional significance. What matters, Pro-
fessor Ackerman claims, is the very clear public choice that the pro-
gressive civil rights principles of the 1960s should be understood as
the fundamental law of the land. The Reagan Revolution, Ackerman
continues, has not achieved that overwhelming political success nec-
essary to constitutionalize conservative civil rights visions. Impressive
Republican victories in some branches of government during the
1980 and 1994 national elections were followed by impressive Demo-
cratic victories in other branches of government during the 1982 and
1996 national elections. Conservative attempts to control the na-
tional judiciary were thwarted when the Senate refused to confirm
the nomination ofJudge Bork to the Supreme Court. The 2000 elec-
tion could not have altered this constitutional status quo. A party
that lost the popular vote in the most recent presidential election and
whose majority in the House of Representatives is the smallest in re-
cent history has clearly not demonstrated the overwhelming public
" This paragraph largely summarizes the argument in ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
23, at 3-162.
7 This paragraph largely summarizes claims made in ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
23 at 50-52, 108-11 and ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMIATIONS, supra note 23, at 389-95.
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support Professor Ackerman believes necessary for a constitutional
moment.
Professor Ackerman's reading of American constitutional devel-
opment sends optimistic theoretical and empirical messages to the
political Left. The explicit optimistic theoretical message is that the
constitutional aspirations of Reconstruction Republicans, New Deal
Democrats, and civil rights activists remain the law of the land. Pro-
gressives in 2002 must still demonstrate that their present constitu-
tional vision is the best interpretation of the progressive understand-
ing of civil rights constitutionalized during the 1960s. The crucial
point is that Ackerman regards the constitutional order as still struc-
tured by the three greatest moments of progressive triumph in
American constitutional history. Progressives are the persons who
must merely maintain the constitutional status quo, while members of
the Rehnquist Court are the would-be revolutionaries. The implicit
optimistic empirical message is that the general public remains open
to progressive constitutional arguments. Conservative Republicans
have won some victories in recent elections, but in Professor Acker-
man's eyes the center-right coalition has not yet convinced the public
to abandon Reconstruction, New Deal, and civil rights values. Pro-
ponents of progressive constitutional values still have an equal, if not
privileged, position in the constitutional universe laid out in Acker-
man's We the People. Ackerman's constitution still belongs to liberal
Democrats. All the Left may need in the next election cycle to regain
constitutional influence is more luck, more charismatic candidates,
and perhaps better designed ballots.
2. Klinkner and Smith's Pessimism
Professors Klinkner and Smith present a decidedly more pessimis-
tic view of American constitutional development. They treat as rare,
ephemeral periods those constitutional moments that Professor Ack-
erman claims structure constitutional politics in the United States.
All three scholars agree that at certain times in American history
dramatic surges occur in public support for progressive understand-
ings of racial equality. All agree that the Revolutionary War, Recon-
struction, and New Deal (extended to the Civil Rights Movement of
the 1960s) are the three main constitutional moments in American
history.7 More so than Professor Ackerman, however, Professors
Klinkner and Smith highlight how substantial resistance to those un-
derstandings forced more egalitarian forces to accept many inegali-
tarian compromises. More important, Klinkner and Smith insist that
these surge periods are typically rooted in short term political forces,
most notably the need to mobilize the entire population to face an




external threat. When the threat is removed, momentum for greater
racial equality dissipates. A lengthy period of retrenchment follows,
where new inegalitarian practices gradually replace those inegali-
tarian practices abandoned during the most recent progressive surge.
Periods of racial progress "have come in concentrated bursts of ten to
fifteen years," they write, while decline tends to come in "period[s] of
sixty to seventy-five years."' ° Americans never completely undo the
racial progress made during a progressive surge." Still, Klinkner and
Smith insist that progressive surges are short-lived and that conserva-
tive rulers in periods of retrenchment interpret those surge periods
as narrowly as possible. "[E]xceptional circumstances," in their view,
are necessary to facilitate racial progress.2
Professors Klinkner and Smith attach greater significance than
Professor Ackerman to political developments over the last thirty
years. The Civil Rights Movement enjoyed success during the 1950s
and early 1960s, they contend, because the moral imperative of end-
ing racism was yoked to the political imperative of attracting interna-
tional support against Communism. Racial progress occurred from
1941 to 1968 as "the United States continuously mobilized huge
numbers of black soldiers for actual or possible combat against Nazi
and Communist foes, against which American leaders stressed the na-
tion's democratic ideals."m The past thirty years have exhibited a
steady erosion in racial equality, as a relatively durable center-right
coalition maintains power. "[A]s the imperatives of the Cold War
lessened and ultimately disappeared," Klinkner and Smith declare,
"so [too] would America's march toward racial equality."84 The ab-
sence of the conditions historically necessary for racial progress sug-
gest that the present regime is likely to be fairly durable. Democrats
may win elections, but progressive Democrats are not likely to influ-
ence constitutional meanings for the foreseeable future. The center-
right coalition, in this view, is deeply rooted in the political landscape
of the early twenty-first century and probably cannot be overthrown
until a new crisis, similar to the Civil or Cold War, creates a better en-
vironment for more progressive notions of equality.
The thesis of Klinkner and Smith provides progressives with good
and bad news. The good news is that progressive surges leave a rec-
ord that future progressives can appropriate to their ends. Progres-
sives looking for friends at crucial constitutional moments will find
them. The crisis conditions responsible for creating constitutional
moments create those conditions that make Americans more sympa-
KUNKNER & SMITH, supra note 24, at 5.
8' See id. at 8 (stating that although racial progress has not been either inevitable or irre-
versible in America, it has been in significant ways cumulative).
2id.
" Id. at 4.
Id. at 287.
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thetic to progressive understandings of equality. The first piece of
bad news is that conservatives looking for friends at crucial constitu-
tional moments will also be successful. Progressive triumphs during
constitutional moments are never complete. During the Reconstruc-
tion, New Deal, and Civil Rights eras, more conservative notions of
equality had to be accommodated. History will support progressive
attempts to expand progressive practices and conservative efforts to
narrow those practices. The more important piece of bad news is
that the political conditions of normal politics favor opponents of
progressive notions of equality. Progressive surges are rare. During
periods of retrenchment Americans typically prefer the most conser-
vative interpretation of racial progress made in the past. "[F]urther
progress toward a just and harmonious overcoming of racial divisions
and inequalities might not occur in our time," Klinkner and Smith
conclude "unless we as a people make extraordinary efforts of a sort
we have never undertaken before except under the most extreme du-
ress."8
This historical analysis suggests that Americans are constitution-
ally unlikely to accept progressive understandings of racial equality
during times of what Ackerman calls "normal politics."8" Such under-
standings are historically available. Ackerman, Klinkner, and Smith
agree that during constitutional moments or progressive surges, pro-
gressives significantly influence official constitutional meanings. The
problem is first, that more conservative citizens also significantly in-
fluence official constitutional meanings at that time, and second, that
the nature of politics in the absence of the conditions that promote
progressive surges privileges more conservative understandings of the
last progressive surge. The Bush dynasty, in the view of Klinkner and
Smith, represents a typical aftermath of a spent progressive surge
rather than, as Ackerman suggests, a series of failed conservative con-
stitutional moments. As a matter of history, progressives do not tri-
umph by restoring the old progressive surge, but by taking advantage
of the conditions that promote a new progressive surge. Central to
these conditions is an enemy that can be understood as committed to
racially inegalitarian doctrines, an enemy that does not appear on the
present horizon. No evidence exists at present that the action against
Osama Bin Laden is inspiring more economically or racially egalitar-
ian policies.
The differences between the present constitutional universe and
the universe in which the Left next exercises substantial power are
likely to be substantial rather than minimal if Professors Klinkner and
Smith correctly understand American constitutional development.
Progressives, in their view, will significantly influence official constitu-
tional meanings only after dramatic political changes take place.
Id. at 3.
86 See generally AKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 23.
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Progressives only have the vaguest notions of the external events that
will precipitate this political change. No one knows how those events
will reconstitute the polity or reconstitute progressives. If present
constitutional politics is best described as the lengthy retrenchment
after a progressive surge, progressive constitutional theory written in
2002 will be politically inefficacious. Progressive constitutional
thought will not influence conservatives in the present and will be too
dated to influence progressives in the future.
II. LESSONS FROMJUDGE ROBERT BORK
The fate of the shadow constitution drafted by Judge Bork in
197117 should chasten progressives who hope that their present writ-
ings will guide progressive judicial majorities in the future. Judge
Bork seems the perfect case study, superficially, for demonstrating
the value of the shadow constitution enterprise. His writings when
conservatives were out of power earned him a seat on the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and a
nomination to the Supreme Court. Judge Bork is presently an iconic
figure within the triumphant conservative movement. Nevertheless,
while Judge Bork has personally done well over the past twenty years,
his shadow constitution has had almost no influence on public policy.
His concerns are not the concerns of the Rehnquist Court majority,
which has gone in directions almost entirely unanticipated by any
prominent conservative constitutionalist writing when conservatives
were out of power.
The shadow constitution set out in Bork's Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems bears almost no relationship to the offi-
cial constitution promulgated by the Rehnquist Court. Bork's
shadow constitution insisted that "[c]onstitutional protection should
be accorded only to speech that is explicitly political, "'s that both the
clear and present danger test and the incitement standard set out in
Brandenburg v. Ohio should be abandoned," that state courts could
enforce covenants not to sell property to persons of color,90 that the
one person, one vote standard had no constitutional foundation,9
and that married persons had no constitutional right to use birth
control.92 The Rehnquist Court has rejected all these suggestions.
That tribunal unanimously insists that non-political speech, most no-
tably commercial advertisements, are protected by the Constitution 9'
, See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Prindples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1 (1971) [hereinafter Bork, Neutral Principles].
Idat20.
See id at 34-35.
® See id. at 15-17.
" See id. at 18-19.
See id. at 7-11.
See, e g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (holding
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and unanimously regards the Brandenburg standard as appropriate for
determining free speech rights.94 Shelley v. Kraemer,90 Reynolds v. Sims
and Griswold v. Connecticu?7 are in no danger of being overruled 98
Much to Bork's dismay, a clear Rehnquist Court majority insists that
the Constitution protects abortion rights.9 The main arenas for
Rehnquist Court activism have involved the expansion of Tenth
Amendment rights of states and the limitation of the reach of the In-
terstate Commerce Clause.00 These matters were ignored in Judge
Bork's writings during the 1970s. Indeed, state rights and enumer-
ated power issues played no significant role in his 1990 book.1' Pro-
gressives writing in 2002 should wonder whether they will have any
more influence on the direction of a future progressive court than
Judge Bork has had on the direction of the Rehnquist Court.
Other conservative shadow constitutions drafted before 1986 pro-
vided similarly poor guides to Rehnquist Court decision making. A
central conservative concern in these years was promoting judicial re-
straint in the name of democratic majoritarianism. Lino Graglia
spoke for many on the political right in 1985 when he asserted that
"[t]he basic justification for democracy is that experience has not
shown us a better way of resolving these conflicts than to abide by the
collective wisdom of elected officials, who represent ordinary peo-
ple." 0 2  Moreover, he continued, the Constitution properly inter-
preted gave those elected officials the latitude to make almost any
policy they pleased. "Ifjudicial review were in fact limited to merely
that federal limits on casino advertising violate the First Amendment).
See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995)
(citing Brandenburg as support in holding that forcing parade organizers to admit certain
groups violates their First Amendment rights).
334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment bars state courts from en-
forcing race-based restrictive covenants).
377 U.S. 533 (1964) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause requires the Alabama leg-
islature to apportion its districts based on population).
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down state law forbidding the distribution and use of con-
traceptives).
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (citing Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)); Washing-
ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (citing Shelley, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)).
" See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844-65 (1992) (striking down a spousal
consent provision of a Pennsylvania abortion statute and reaffirming the central holding of Roe
v. Wade). For Bork's criticism of that decision, see ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS
GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 103 (1996).
' See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
compel state officers to enact or enforce federal regulatory programs); Seminole Tribe of Flor-
ida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits Con-
gress from making states eligible to be sued in federal court); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that the Commerce Clause does not allow Congress to regulate
firearms in school zones).
1o1 See generally ROBERT H. BORM, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990).
' Lino Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational Defense ofJudicial Review, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 1331, 1344 (1985).
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enforcing the restrictions of the Constitution," Graglia concluded,
"there would be so few occasions for its exercise that it would be a
subject of little controversy or even interest."103 The Rehnquist Court
has not heeded this advice. The conservative judicial majority on that
tribunal has been more prone to expand judicial power into new ar-
eas of political life than to curtail instances where statutes had previ-
ously been declared unconstitutional. 4 Such conservative scholars as
Richard Epstein and Bernard Siegan who did call for the Justices to
declare statutes unconstitutional emphasized constitutional rights to
economic freedom.' s Rehnquist Court Justices, while occasionally
using the Takings Clause to strike down a local measure, 1°' are far
more inclined than any influential conservative scholar writing in the
1960s, 1970s or early 1980s to use the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments as main sources for judicial decisions declaring laws unconsti-
tutional.
This Article helps explain why the shadow constitution Judge Bork
drafted in 1971 did not become the official constitution promulgated
by the Rehnquist Court. The practical costs and benefits of different
free speech principles have changed significantly over the past thirty
years. 07 During the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, progres-
sives and reactionary extremists were the persons most likely to be
protected by expansive understandings of constitutional free speech
rights. More recently, persons expressing socially conservative atti-
tudes have felt themselves in need of constitutional protection from
university hate speech codes and claims of harassment in the work-
place. Reapportionment, once thought to empower urban Demo-
cratic constituencies, is now regarded as increasing the political
power of more economically conservative suburbanites.' judicial
decisions in 2002 overruling Brandenburg v. Ohio' and Reynolds v.
'" Id.
..See ToM KECK, THE SUPREME COURT AND MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM 1937-
2001 (forthcoming 2003).
'0' See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1980).
'0 See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-31 (1992) (holding that state
regulations that deprive land of any economically beneficial use without compensation violate
the Takings Clause, unless the proffered uses were not contemplated under the title); Nollan v.
Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 838-42 (1987) (finding that a building permit conditioned
on granting a public easement constitutes a taking of property).
107 The analysis of free speech lav in this paragraph borrow from Balkin, supra note 36 and
TAKING THE CONSTrrrTON AWAY, supra note 31, at 129-33.
"' See Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 19-20 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993); see also GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 293-303 (1991)
(discussing reapportionment).
'..395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down state criminal syndicalism statute as violative of free
speech).
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Sims,"0 thus, would not promote conservative political interests.
These landmark progressive free speech precedents, along with cases
like New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,' also at present provide precedent
for important conservative legal principles. Rehnquist Court Justices
frequently rely on the broad statements about the First Amendment
made in those cases when attacking campaign finance reform and
regulation of commercial speech.1
2 Finally, Griswold v. Connecticut
3
has not been overruled because doing so is politically impossible.
Virtually all Americans agree that married couples ought to have the
right to use contraception. While conventional wisdom in the late
1970s was that abortion was a conservative wedge issue, present con-
ventional wisdom is that Republicans should downplay their opposi-
tion to reproductive choice or lose support from crucial swing vot-
ers. 14 In short, Judge Bork got the future wrong. Broad free speech
protection contributes far more than he anticipated to conservative
principles and interests. Attacking reproductive choice is politically
more risky than he realized.
Judge Bork drafted a poor shadow constitution if shadow constitu-
tions, as well as shadow cabinets, are judged by their capacity to serve
as vehicles for bringing down the incumbent regime. Conservatives
in the 1960s and early 1970s were not going to gain power on a plat-
form of restricting both free speech and reproductive choice. For
every voter attracted by that conservative vision, another voter, typi-
cally a more affluent voter, was repelled. Conservatives were pro-
pelled to power by some combination of racial politics, taxes, and a
globalizing economy."5 The shadow constitution laid out in Kevin
Phillips's The Emerging Republican Majority,"6 proved a far better guide
to effect political action by conservatives than the shadow constitu-
tion laid down in Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems1
7
"o 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
.' 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that to prevail on a defamation claim, a public official must
show that speaker or publisher acted with actual malice).
' See, e.g., Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,412 (2000) (ThomasJ, dissenting)
(citing Sullivan in support of limits on federal and state power to regulate campaign finance);
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484,498 (1996) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969), to support limits on state power to regulate commercial speech). Brandenburg
has also been cited as support for excluding gay citizens from the Boy Scouts, see Boy Scouts of
Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and parades, see Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bi-
sexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 574 (1995).
"' 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14 See GRABER, RETHINKING ABORTION, supra note 32, at 131-33.
"' For three informative summaries of the forces responsible for the conservative rise to
power, see THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY (1984); THOMAS BYRNE
EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON
AMERICAN POLITICS (1991); STANLEY B. GREENBERG, MIDDLE CLASS DREAMS: THE POLITICS AND
POWER OF THE NEW AMERICAN MAJORITY (rev. ed. 1996).
116 KEVIN P. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING REPUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969).
1 Bork, Neutral Principles, supra note 87.
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or any other conservative constitutional analysis published in the
1960s and early 1970s.
Progressive shadow constitutions that purport to be politically ef-
ficacious as well as being intellectual exercises should similarly be
judged by their capacity to be vehicles for bringing down the incum-
bent center-right regime. Under this standard, the fundamental con-
stitutional debate progressives must resolve is whether the present
conservative governing coalition seems relatively durable. If Acker-
man is right, Americans retain both a normative and a practical
commitment to the progressive ideas constitutionalized during the
New Deal and the Civil Rights Movement. Further progressive debate
over the content of those ideas makes sense given their continuing
vitality in American politics. The Left, after all, may be only a more
charismatic candidate away from regaining substantial power to in-
fluence official constitutional meanings. With a return to power po-
tentially imminent progressives must quickly figure out whether
Maimonidean equal protection will be implemented should they win
the next election. If Klinkner and Smith are right, the progressive
ideas of the New Deal and Civil Rights Movement have lost their ca-
pacity to inspire successful progressive coalitions. Further debate
over the meaning of those progressive ideas is an exercise in nostal-
gia. Explaining in great detail why the existing regime is really com-
mitted to Maimonidean equal protection or some other progressive
ideal in theory seems a pure academic exercise if that regime must be
overthrown for progressives to realize their ideals in practice.
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